INTRODUCTION
Doctors of all specialties from time to time find themselves faced by ethical conundrums. Some of the most difficult of these are cases where the patient is unwilling to consent to a treatment the doctor feels is clearly necessary. In most cases refusal is the patient's right, but sometimes there is the dilemma of what to do if the patient is felt unable either to give or to refuse consent as a result of physical or mental illness.
The Mental Health Act (1983)1 aims to provide care without compulsion wherever possible, but relates only to the assessment and treatment of patients with mental disorders and does not allow doctors to enforce physical treatments for non-psychiatric illness irrespective of whether or not there is evidence of mental disorder. Physical treatment cannot be given to any patient under the Act without consent, and consent can be withdrawn at any time2 '3 In England the law has evolved in two ways. The first is by the passing of specific laws and statutes by Parliament (e.g. the Mental Health Act, 1983), and the second is case law, which is not based on specific statutes but reflects the sum total of all the judgements and precedents made in different court rulings over the years. This body of law is known as the 'Common Law'4. Common Law protects patients from having operations or other procedures imposed on them against their wishes by their physicians by the tort known as 'trespass of person'. 'The fundamental principle, plain and incontestable, is that every person's body is inviolable'5. An assault occurs when a person acts to make another fear immediate physical threat. Battery is the actual application of unlawful force and therefore occurs when a person has a physical treatment imposed on him without consent4. However, there is also a well established principle in English law that doctors have a legal duty of care to give proper treatment and if they fail to do so they may be found negligent6. The dilemma is, therefore, that if a doctor treats a patient without consent, he or she may be found guilty of battery or assault, but failure to treat may result in a charge of negligence.
Many doctors are uncertain about when patients' refusal of treatment can be rightfully over-ruled. Under Common Law any individual (including doctors and nurses) is allowed to apprehend and restrain a person who is mentally disordered and presents an imminent danger to himself or others as long as the restraint is proportional and sufficient to bring the emergency to an end. It does not justify the use of excessive or prolonged force. An important point is that restraint cannot continue after the immediate crisis is over. This clearly covers situations where there is immediate danger, not just a general concern about illness7.
Treatment can be given under Common Law in cases of 'urgent necessity' (e.g. life saving treatment when the patient cannot give consent because of being unconscious but was not known to object to treatment)8. What about cases where the patient is conscious and refuses treatment or in those difficult cases where there is no immediate danger to the patient but the danger is of a longer term nature with a risk of death, or permanent harm, if medical procedures are not given? This dilemma is illustrated by the following two case reports. over the past few days and had called for an ambulance. When the emergency services arrived she refused to let them into the flat and access was forced. Her son reported that she had lived alone in the flat since 1980 and over the past few years had become increasingly reclusive, refusing to have any contact with relatives or neighbours.
On admission she was unkempt, with unwashed hair, wearing a dirty dress and vest. She was vomiting repeatedly, with bile stained vomit. She expressed delusional beliefs that her stomach had been blown up with ether over several weeks and that it was liable to burst as the result of a Citizens' Band radio which was located in there. She believed that the IRA had been threatening her for years. She was experiencing auditory hallucinations which she identified as coming from the CB receiver in her stomach. One 'voice' told her not to allow anyone to examine her. There was no evidence of an acute confusional state and the symptoms were consistent with a diagnosis of a long-term paranoid psychosis.
On physical examination her abdomen was soft but distended with a hard, craggy, immobile, central mass. A diagnosis of possible intra-abdominal malignancy was made. She had no insight into the fact that she had either a physical or a mental illness. She refused any investigations or treatment. She was admitted under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act to a surgical ward. Following her admission she remained agitated and required sedation for investigations to be carried out into her physical condition. Acute renal failure secondary to dehydration and vomiting was treated with intravenous fluids. Ultrasound scan revealed gross abdominal and pelvic ascites; neither ovary was visualized.
Five days following her admission she remained agitated on the ward and continued to vomit. An ascitic tap was performed. She was started on a regular dose of haloperidol 5 mg twice a day treat her psychosis. Three days later her mental state improved. She was compliant and was no longer expressing any delusional ideas. The cytology report on the ascitic fluid revealed a mucinous adenocarcinoma most likely of ovarian origin and she was referred to the gynaecological oncologist. Unfortunately, her physical condition continued to deteriorate and she died 3 days afterwards. In this case the Mental Health Act (1983) was used to allow treatment of her mental illness; however, investigations and treatment of her physical illness were carried out under Common Law.
Case 2
A 41-year-old unemployed single man was admitted to a psychiatric ward under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act (1983) . He had a history of self-neglect over several months, and his landlord said that he had isolated himself, aggressive behaviour. He had broken a window several days before and cut his right hand.
At interview on admission there was evidence of recent weight loss, and he was malodorous and unshaven. No details of his problems were available from the patient who was unable to answer coherently. He was dressed in pyjamas and was generally unkempt, pacing around the room, adopting strange postures such as holding his right foot up in the air. His mood appeared inappropriate, and he laughed hilariously for no reason. At times he was quite threatening. His eyes wandered about the room and he spat on his own clothing. He swore constantly and was very thought disordered saying 'MX, LF, what's that?'. He appeared to be responding to auditory hallucinations. It was felt that he was suffering from an acute schizophrenic illness. On physical examination, his right index finger was swollen, erythematous and tender from the metacarpophalangeal joint to the proximal interphalangeal joint, with a small laceration anteriorly oozing pus. He was started on oral flucloxacillin 500mg four times daily and this was changed 2 days later to intravenous flucloxacillin. His psychotic symptoms were treated with oral chlorpromazine l00mg four times a day.
Five days after his admission he stated that he 'didn't need antibiotics' and repeatedly removed the intravenous cannulas. He was referred to a surgical team for review as there was no improvement. At this time he had been treated with flucloxacillin for 10 days. His finger was swollen with pus and multiple sinuses. There was clinical evidence of division of flexor digitorum profundus and flexor digitorum superficialis. A diagnosis of osteomyelitis, possibly as a result of a foreign body, was made and it was decided to explore and debride the wound. The patient refused consent to treatment and could not be persuaded. The question of his ability to consent was discussed, and the on-call consultant psychiatrist stated that he was 'not treatable under the Mental Health Act as this applies only to psychiatric treatment; however, under Common Law it is the judgement of the surgeon whether to proceed'. The surgical team stated that 'he would benefit from drainage operatively, but as will not consent, treat conservatively' and that they would be 'happy to review when psychiatrically well'. Intravenous antibiotics were continued, with the addition of penicillin, a swab was taken and his hand was splinted.
The following day he removed the plaster slab and pulled out the Venflon. At interview the patient said that he was experiencing 'lateral thinking straight from your toes to your head, like an amoeba spreading out and moving back in again'. He denied having removed his plaster slab and claimed he had 'never had one'. He believed that his future was 'rosy'. The on-call psychiatrist stated that 'the [surgical] team fear his hand is at risk. If this is the case he is in no smoking and drinking excessively with intermittently mental condition to give or withhold consent for an operation. He has no insight at all into having a problem. Based on this there is clear duty of care for his surgical team to offer and give the best advice for his condition'. It was decided to operate. Although he signed the consent form, his agreement for the operation fluctuated. Surgical drainage was carried out and he made a good physical recovery. Although mentally much improved, he was discharged from hospital 8 weeks later still showing signs of a chronic schizophrenic illness.
DISCUSSION
These two cases highlight the dilemma that doctors experience when dealing with such cases. In both cases the patient was admitted to hospital on a Section of the Mental Health Act (1983). This allows treatment of the mental disorder but not of the physical complaints.
Some general principles are illustrated by the cases described. The problem of consent may mean that doctors postpone offering treatments which otherwise would be clearly advisable. This may sometimes lead to decisions to treat conservatively when an operation would be preferable. The statement that the surgical team would be 'happy to review when psychiatrically well' appears optimistic. In cases of acute or chronic psychosis, there is normally a delay of several weeks before the effects of neuroleptic medication on delusions are seen. Similarly, in the treatment of acute confusional states a delay of several days may occur before the patient is able to consent to treatment. Under these circumstances doctors must weigh up the likely benefits and risks to the individual of delaying active treatment or of choosing to treat conservatively.
Beauchamp and Childress outline four ethical principles to follow when treating patients. These are justice, beneficence, non-maleficence and a respect for a person's autonomy. In the interests of justice a person has a right to expect 'fair, equitable and appropriate treatment'9 Beneficence is the moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. However, it is also a doctor's duty not to inflict harm intentionally (non-maleficence) and to allow a person to be autonomous. A balance between respect for a person's autonomy and acting in their best interests has therefore to be achieved. For a person to be autonomous or self-governing he or she must have the 'capacity for intentional action'9. A person's autonomy is therefore closely related to competency to make a decision and it is this capacity for competency or incompetency which holds the key to an understanding of how doctors should treat patients who refuse vital treatments.
For consent to be valid, certain conditions must be met. These are often described in a simple model in which the patient is provided with information about the relative benefits and risks of the treatment options. This leads to an understanding of the issues involved. The patient must then voluntarily make the decision to receive treatment and this is described as consent4. For the consent to be valid, the patient must be mentally competent to make this decisionl1. Competence to consent is taken to mean that the person is capable of understanding in broad terms the nature, purpose and likely effects of treatment. It is clear from this that many patients with psychiatric or physical disorders (particularly those who are acutely ill) may not be either competent to consent or able to understand the implications, advantages and risks of treatments offered to them in hospital.
Patients cannot be given non-urgent medical interventions against their will if they continue to withhold consent unless they are deemed to be unable to either consent or withhold consent as a result of psychiatric or physical (e.g. confusional state) illness. In these situations, the patient is not competent to either consent or withhold consent. If a decision is taken that a person is not competent to give consent it is the responsibility of the doctor to act in the best interest of the patient, offering treatment that reflects good medical practice in the same way that he or she would if the patient was unconscious. Over the years a number of court rulings have helped clarify the situation. A major ruling was that made by Lord Brandon4: A doctor can lawfully . . . give treatment to adult patients who are incapable for one reason or another of consenting to his doing so providing that the . .treatment concerned is in the best interests of such patients. The . . treatment will be in their best interests if, but only if, it is carried out in order either to save their lives or to ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health.
If a patient's refusal to have treatment is to be overruled, clear and justifiable reasons must be recorded in the notes. Junior doctors in this situation need to communicate with and receive supportive advice from senior colleagues. It is advisable for a senior opinion to be written in the notes and the management plan should be clearly recorded, including a justification for giving or withholding any particular lines of treatment. Although, legally, a relative cannot give consent on behalf of another adult who is unable to consent for whatever reason'1, if possible the relatives should be involved in the decision and their support recorded. In cases where several specialties are involved, a multi-disciplinary approach seems to be the wisest. A useful rule of thumb is to talk to colleagues and relatives, assess the patient's ability to consent or not to treatment, and if this is lacking, to act in his or her best interests, recording the reasoning for this clearly in the notes. Such decisions cannot be made subject to blanket statements that all such patients should be treated in a certain way. The clinical situation in each case must be assessed on its own merits.
